As the Afghan-Soviet war became more
destructive, internal refugees flocked to Kabul and the largest
of the provincial cities. Varying estimates (no authentic census
was taken) put Kabul's population at more than 2 million by the
late 1980s. In many instances villagers fled to Kabul and other
towns to join family or lineage groups already established
there.
At least 3, perhaps 4, million Afghans were thus subject to government
authority and hence exposed to PDPA recruitment or affiliation. Its
largest membership claim was 160,000, starting from a base of between
5,000 and 10,000 immediately after the Soviet invasion. How many members
were active and committed was unclear, but the lure of perquisites, for
example, food and fuel at protected prices, compromised the meaning of
membership. Claims of membership in the NFF ran into the millions, but
its core activists were mostly party members. When it was terminated in
1987, the NFF disappeared without impact. Factionalism
The PDPA was
also never able to rid itself of internal rivalries. Burdened by obvious
evidence that the Soviets oversaw its policies, actively dominated the
crucial sectors of its government, and literally ran the war, the PDPA
could not assert itself as a political force until after the Soviets
left. In the civil war period that followed, it gained significant
respect, but its internal disputes worsened.
Born divided, the PDPA
suffered virtually continuous conflict between its two major factions.
The Soviets imposed a public truce upon Parcham and Khalq, but the
rivalry continued with hostility and disagreement frequently rising to
the surface. Generally, Parcham enjoyed political dominance, while Khalq
could not be denied the leverage over the army held by its senior
officers. It was a marriage necessary for survival.
Social, linguistic, and regional origins and differing degrees of
Marxist radicalism had spurred factionalism from the beginning. When
Soviet forces invaded, there was a fifteen-year history of disagreement,
dislike, rivalry, violence and murder. Each new episode added further
alienation. Events also tended to sub-divide the protagonists. Amin's
murder of Taraki divided the Khalqis. Rival military cliques divided the
Khalqis further.
Parchamis suffered a series of splits when the Soviets insisted on
replacing Karmal with Najibullah as head of the PDPA in 1986. The PDPA
was riven by divisions which prevented implementation of policies and
compromised its internal security. These fundamental weaknesses were
partially masked by the urgency of rallying for common survival in the
immediate aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal. Yet, after military
successes rifts again began to surface. Najibullah's Leadership,
1986-92

Factionalism had a critical impact on
the leadership of the PDPA.
Najibullah's achievements as a mediator between factions, an effective
diplomat, a clever foe, a resourceful administrator and a brilliant
spokesman who coped with constant and changing turmoil throughout his
six years as head of government, qualified him as a leader among
Afghans. His leadership qualities might be summarized as conciliatory
authoritarianism: a sure sense of power, how to get it, how to use it,
but mediated by willingness to give options to rivals. This combination
was glaringly lacking in most of his colleagues and rivals.
Najibullah
suffered, to a lesser degree, the same disadvantage that Karmal had when
he was installed as General Secretary of the PDPA by the Soviets.
Despite Soviet interference and his own frustration and discouragement
over the failure to generate substantial popular support, Karmal still
had retained enough loyalty within the party to remain in office. This
fact was shown by the fierceness of the resistance to Najibullah's
appointment within the Parcham faction. This split persisted, forcing
Najibullah to straddle his politics between whatever Parchami support he
could maintain and alliances he could win from the Khalqis.
Najibullah's reputation was that of a secret police apparatchik with
especially effective skills in disengaging Ghilzai and eastern Pushtuns
from the resistance. Najibullah was himself a Ghilzai from the large
Ahmedzai tribe. His selection by the Soviets was clearly related to his
success in running KHAD, the secret police, more effectively than the
rest of the DRA had been governed. His appointment thus, was not
principally the result of intra-party politics. It was related to
crucial changes in the Soviet-Afghan war that would lead to the Soviet
military withdrawal.
The Soviet Decision to
Withdraw, 1986-88
These
changes in the war came at the peak of the fighting. In 1985-86
Soviet forces launched their largest and most effective assaults
on the mujahidin
supply lines adjacent to Pakistan. Major campaigns had also forced the
mujahidin into the defensive near Herat and Qandahar.
At the same time
a sharp increase in military support for the mujahidin from the United
States and Saudi Arabia allowed it to regain the guerilla war
initiative. By late August 1986, the first Stinger ground-to-air
missiles were used successfully. For nearly a year they would deny the
Soviets and the Kabul government effective use of air power.
These shifts in momentum reinforced the inclination of the new
Gorbachev government to view further escalation of the war as a misuse
of Soviet political and military capital. Such doubts had developed
prior to the decision to install Najibullah. In April 1985, one month
after Mikhail Gorbachev assumed the Soviet leadership, its May Day
greeting to the Kabul government failed to refer to its "revolutionary
solidarity" with the PDPA, a signal in Marxist-Leninist rhetoric that
their relationship had been downgraded. Several months later, Karmal
suggested the inclusion of non-party members in the Revolutionary
Council and the promotion of a "mixed economy." These tentative
concessions toward non-Marxists won Soviet praise, but divergence in
policy became obvious at the Twenty-Seventh Congress of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union in February 1986. Gorbachev's "bleeding wound"
speech hinted at a decision to withdraw "in the nearest future." In his
own speech Karmal made no reference to withdrawal. In early May he was
replaced by Najibullah.
Najibullah was obliged to move toward the evolving Soviet position
with great caution. Karmal's followers could use any concessions to
non-Marxists or acceptance of a Soviet withdrawal against him.
Accordingly, he moved in conflicting directions, insisting there was no
room for non-Marxists in government, only offering the possibility of
clemency to "bandits" who had been duped by Mujahidin leaders into
resisting the government. In addition to air strikes and shelling across
the border, KHAD terrorist activity in Pakistan reached its peak under
Najibullah.
Late in 1986 Najibullah had stabilized his political position enough
to begin matching Moscow's moves toward withdrawal. In September he set
up the National Compromise Commission to contact counterrevolutionaries
"in order to complete the Saur Revolution in its new phase." Allegedly
some 40,000 rebels were contacted. In November Karmal was replaced as
now-ceremonial president by a non-party member, Haji Muhammad Samkanai,
signaling the PDPA's willingness to open government to non-Marxists.
At the end of 1986 Najibullah unveiled a program of "National
Reconciliation." It offered a six-month cease-fire and discussions
leading to a possible coalition government in which the PDPA would give
up its government monopoly. Contact was to be made with "anti-state
armed groups." Affiliation was suggested, allowing resistance forces to
retain areas under their control.
In fact much of the substance of the program was happening on the
ground in the form of negotiations with disillusioned mujahidin
commanders who agreed to cooperate as government militia. The mujahidin
leadership rhetorically claimed that the program had no chance for
success. For his part Najibullah assured his followers that there would
be no compromise over "the accomplishments" of the Saur Revolution. It
remained a standoff. While a strenuous propaganda effort was directed at
the both the Afghan refugees and Pakistanis in Pakistan's Northwest
Frontier Province, the program was essentially a sop to Moscow's hope to
tie a favorable political settlement to its desire to pull its forces
out.
Najibullah's concrete achievements were the consolidation of his
armed forces, the expansion of co-opted militia forces and the
acceptance of his government by an increasing proportion of urban
population under his control. As a propaganda ploy "National
Reconciliation" was a means of gaining time to prepare for civil war
after the Soviet departure.