Daud was compelled to concentrate much
of his energy on getting rid of his Marxist allies who had made the coup
possible by penetrating the military officer corps. These erstwhile
allies were members of the Parcham faction of the Peoples Democratic
Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). They had expected to share power and then
get rid of Daud. They also had scores to settle with the Islamic
militants they had fought against at the national university and the
politicians who had served in Zahir Shah's constitutional government.
Hundreds of members of the Ikwani Musalamin (Muslim Brotherhood, also
known in Afghanistan as the Muslim Youth), were arrested--many were
later executed. Former Prime Minister Muhammad Hashim Maiwandwal was
murdered by Parchami henchmen while in police custody for alleged
involvement in a coup attempt.
By 1975 Daud had moved carefully to purge the Marxists from his
cabinet. In 1977 he attempted to consolidate his position by
promulgating a new constitution which concentrated power in his
presidency and channeled popular support through a single party system.
Under some Soviet and Indian communist pressure, the Afghan Marxists
interrupted their factional feuding long enough to unite in an attempt
to overthrow Daud's government. Incensed by Daud's foreign policy shift
away from them, the Soviets made clear to the Afghan Marxists their
willingness to see Daud removed. He had moved close to Iran, Pakistan
and Egypt (after Sadat had reconciled with Israel).
Having isolated himself from the liberals who had served the king and
the Islamic militants he had persecuted, Daud had to rely heavily on his
security and military forces to stay in power. The Marxists effectively
penetrated them. As a result his efforts to prevent a coup were bungled.
While most of the armed forces stood aside, Marxist collaborators in the
army and the air force launched an assault on Daud's palace that
overwhelmed his Republican Guards.
USURPATION, INVASION AND WAR:
1978-92 The
April 1978 Coup d'etat and the
Democratic Republic of Afghanistan
With Muhammad Daud's death, the government of Afghanistan was run by
a divided, dilettante Marxist clique that launched a train of events
eventually leading to the disintegration of the state. They named their
regime the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA).
The "Saur Revolution," as the new government grandiloquently labeled
its coup d'etat (after the month in the Islamic calendar in which it
occurred), was almost entirely the achievement of the Khalq faction of
the PDPA. This success gave it effective control over the armed forces,
a great advantage over its Parchami rival. Khalq's victory was partially
due to Daud's miscalculation that Parcham was the more serious threat.
Parcham's leaders had enjoyed widespread connections within the senior
bureaucracy and even the royal family and the most privileged elite.
These linkages also tended to make their movements easy to trace.
Khalq, on the other hand ,had not been involved in Daud's government,
had little connection with Kabul's Persian speaking elite, and a rustic
reputation based on recruitment of students from the provinces. Most of
them were Pushtuns, especially the Ghilzais. They had few apparent
connections in the senior bureaucracy, many had taken jobs as school
teachers. Khalq's influence at Kabul University was also limited.
These newcomers to Kabul had seemed poorly positioned to penetrate
the government. Moreover, they were led by the erratic Muhammad Taraki,
a poet, sometime minor official, and a publicly notorious radical.
Confident that his military officers were reliable, Daud must have
discounted the diligence of Taraki's lieutenant, Hafizullah Amin, who
had sought out dissident Pushtun officers. The bungling of Amin's
arrest, which enabled him to trigger the coup ahead of its planned date,
also suggests Khalq's penetration of Daud's security police.
The plotters carried out a bold and sophisticated plan. It employed
the shock effect of a combined armored and air assault on the Arg or
palace, the seat of Daud's highly centralized government. Seizure of the
initiative demoralized the larger loyal or uncommitted forces nearby.
Quick capture of telecommunications, the defense ministry and other
strategic centers of authority isolated Daud's stubbornly resisting
palace guard.
The coup was by far Khalq's most successful achievement. So much so,
that a considerable literature has accumulated arguing that it must have
been planned and executed by the KGB, or some special branch of the
Soviet military. Given the friction that soon developed between Khalq
and Soviet officials, especially over the purging of Parcham, Soviet
control of the coup seems unlikely. Prior knowledge of it does appear to
have been highly likely. Claims that Soviet pilots bombed the palace
overlook the availability of seasoned Afghan pilots.
Political leadership of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan was
asserted within three days of the military takeover. After thirteen
years of conspiratorial activity, the two factions of the PDPA emerged
in public, refusing at first, to admit their Marxist credentials.
Khalq's dominance was quickly apparent. Taraki became president, prime
minister and General Secretary of the PDPA. Parcham's leader, Babrak
Karmal, and Amin were named deputy prime ministers. Cabinet membership
was split eleven to ten , with Khalq in the majority. Khalq dominated
the Revolutionary Council, which was to serve as the ruling body of the
government. Within weeks purges of Parcham began, and by summer Khalq's
somewhat bewildered Soviet patrons became aware of how difficult it
would be temper its radicalism. The destruction of Afghanistan's former
ruling elite had begun immediately after the seizure of power. Execution
(Parcham leaders later claimed at least 11,000 during the Taraki/Amin
period), flight into exile, and later the devastation of Kabul itself
would literally remove the great majority of the some 100,000 who had
come to form Afghanistan's elite and middle class. Their loss has almost
completely broken the continuity of Afghanistan's leadership, political
institutions and their social foundation.
The Khalq leadership proved incapable of filling this vacuum. Its
brutal and clumsy attempts to introduce radical changes in control over
agricultural land holding and credit, rural social relations, marriage
and family arrangements, and education led to scattered protests and
uprisings among all major communities in the Afghan countryside. Taraki
and Amin left a legacy of turmoil and resentment which gravely
compromised later Marxist attempts to win popular acceptance. Soviet Control and Marxist Government,
1980-89
Despite its fatal
weaknesses, the DRA generated a remarkable political process during its
short history. When Babrak Karmal was installed as head of state by
invading Soviet forces at the beginning of 1980, his government faced
crippling disabilities. Installation by a foreign power prevented
popular acceptance of the legitimacy of his government. Even though the
Parchamis, themselves, had been among the groups most viciously
persecuted by the Khalqis, their identification with Marxism and Soviet
repression was not forgiven. Indeed, the decimation of their members
forced the Soviets to insist on reconciliation between the two factions.
The purging of Parchamis had left the military forces so dominated by
Khalqis that the Soviets had no choice but to rely upon Khalqi officers
to rebuild the army.
Soviet miscalculation of what was required to
crush Afghan resistance further aggravated the government's situation.
The Afghan army was expected to carry the burden of suppressing
opposition, which was to be done quickly with Soviet support. As the war
of pacification dragged on for years, the Babrak Karmal government was
further weakened by the poor performance of its army.
Government Organization
Government was reconstructed in classical Leninist fashion.
Until 1985 it was governed by a provisional constitution, "The
Fundamental Principles of the Democratic Republic of
Afghanistan." Supreme sovereignty was vested in a Revolutionary
Council, originally a body of fifty-eight members whose number
later varied. Its executive committee, the Presidium, exercised
power when the council was not in formal session.
The Revolutionary Council was presided over by the president
of the Democratic Republic. Its powers included ratification of
legislation and treaties; official appointments; declarations of war and
military emergencies; the creation of new government agencies; and
approval of social and economic policies.
Beneath the council the cabinet functioned under a Prime Minister,
essentially in a format inherited from the pre-Marxist era. Two new
ministries were added: Islamic Affairs and Tribes and Nationalities.
Administrative arrangements for provincial and sub-provincial government
were also retained.
In Leninist style, the PDPA was closely juxtaposed with the formal
instruments of government. Its authority was generated by its Central
Committee, whose executive stand-in was its Politburo. Presiding over
both was the party's secretary general. Policy generation was the
primary function of the executive level of the party, which was to be
carried out by its members serving throughout the government. The Search for Popular Support
In
attempts to broaden support, the PDPA created organizations and launched political
initiatives intended to induce popular participation. The most ambitious
was the National Fatherland Front (NFF), founded in June 1981. This
umbrella organization created local units in cities, towns and tribal
areas which were to recruit supporters of the regime. Village and tribal
notables were offered inducements to participate in well publicized
rallies and programs. The party also gave affiliated organizations that
enrolled women, youth and city workers high profile exposure in national
radio, television, and government publications.
From its beginnings in
the mid-1960s, the membership of the PDPA had taken keen interest in the
impact of information and propaganda. Some years after their own
publications had been terminated by government, they gained control of
all official media. These were energetically harnessed to their
propaganda goals. Anis, the mainline government newspaper
(published in Pashtu and Dari), the Kabul New Times (previously
the Kabul Times), published in English, and such new
publications as Haqiqat-i-Inqelab-i-Saur exhibited the regime's
flair for propaganda. With Kabul as its primary constituency, it also
made innovative use of television.
The early efforts at mobilizing popular support were later followed
up by national meetings and assemblies, eventually using a variation of
the model of the traditional Loya Jirgah to entice the cooperation of
rural secular leaders and religious authorities. A large scale Loya
Jirgah was held in 1985 to ratify the DRA's new constitution.
These attempts to win collaboration were closely coordinated with
efforts to manipulate Pushtun tribal politics. Such efforts included
trying to split or disrupt tribes who affiliated with the resistance, or
by compromising notables into commitments to raise militia forces in
service to the government.
A concerted effort was made to win over the principal minorities:
Uzbeq, Turkoman, and Tajik, in northern Afghanistan. For the first time
their languages and literatures were prominently broadcast and published
by government media. Minority writers and poets were championed ,and
attention was given to their folk art, music, dance and lore.
