It was not
until 1826 that the energetic Dost Mohammad was able to exert sufficient
control over his brothers to take over the throne in Kabul, where he
proclaimed himself amir. Although the British had begun to show
interest in Afghanistan as early as their 1809 treaty with Shuja, it was
not until the reign of Dost Mohammad, first of the Muhammadzai rulers,
that the opening gambits were played in what came to be known as the
"Great Game." The Great Game set in motion the confrontation of the
British and Russian empires--whose spheres of influence moved steadily
closer to one another until they met in Afghanistan. It also involved
Britain's repeated attempts to impose a puppet government in Kabul. The
remainder of the nineteenth century saw greater European involvement in
Afghanistan and her surrounding territories and heightened conflict
among the ambitious local rulers as Afghanistan's fate played out
globally.
Dost Mohammad achieved prominence among his brothers through clever
use of the support of his mother's Qizilbash tribesmen and his own
youthful apprenticeship under his brother, Fateh Khan. Among the many
problems he faced was repelling Sikh encroachment on the Pashtun areas
east of the Khyber Pass. After working assiduously to establish control
and stability in his domains around Kabul, the amir next chose to
confront the Sikhs.
In 1834 Dost Mohammad defeated an invasion by the former ruler, Shah
Shuja, but his absence from Kabul gave the Sikhs the opportunity to
expand westward. Ranjit Singh's forces occupied Peshawar, moving from
there into territory ruled directly by Kabul. In 1836 Dost Mohammad's
forces, under the command of his son Akbar Khan, defeated the Sikhs at
Jamrud, a post fifteen kilometers west of Peshawar. The Afghan leader
did not follow up this triumph by retaking Peshawar, however, but
instead contacted Lord Auckland, the new British governor general in
India, for help in dealing with the Sikhs. With this letter, Dost
Mohammad formally set the stage for British intervention in Afghanistan.
At the heart of the Great Game lay the willingness of Britain and Russia
to subdue, subvert, or subjugate the small independent states that lay
between them.
The debacle of the Afghan civil war left a vacuum in the Hindu Kush
area that concerned the British, who were well aware of the many times
in history it had been employed as the invasion route to India. In the
early decades of the nineteenth century, it became clear to the British
that the major threat to their interests in India would not come from
the fragmented Afghan empire, the Iranians, or the French, but from the
Russians, who had already begun a steady advance southward from the
Caucasus.
At the same time, the Russians feared permanent British occupation in
Central Asia as the British encroached northward, taking the Punjab,
Sindh, and Kashmir. The British viewed Russia's absorption of the
Caucasus, the Kirghiz and Turkmen lands, and the Khanates of Khiva and
Bukhara with equal suspicion as a threat to their interests in the
Indian subcontinent.
In addition to this rivalry between Britain and Russia, there were
two specific reasons for British concern over Russia's intentions. First
was the Russian influence at the Iranian court, which prompted the
Russians to support Iran in its attempt to take Herat, historically the
western gateway to Afghanistan and northern India. In 1837 Iran advanced
on Herat with the support and advice of Russian officers. The second
immediate reason was the presence in Kabul in 1837 of a Russian agent,
Captain P. Vitkevich, who was ostensibly there, as was the British agent
Alexander Burnes, for commercial discussions.
The British demanded that Dost Mohammad sever all contact with the
Iranians and Russians, remove Vitkevich from Kabul, surrender all claims
to Peshawar, and respect Peshawar's independence as well as that of
Qandahar, which was under the control of his brothers at the time. In
return, the British government intimated that it would ask Ranjit Singh
to reconcile with the Afghans. When Auckland refused to put the
agreement in writing, Dost Mohammad turned his back on the British and
began negotiations with Vitkevich.
In 1838 Auckland, Ranjit Singh, and Shuja signed an agreement stating
that Shuja would regain control of Kabul and Qandahar with the help of
the British and Sikhs; he would accept Sikh rule of the former Afghan
provinces already controlled by Ranjit Singh, and that Herat would
remain independent. In practice, the plan replaced Dost Mohammad with a
British figurehead whose autonomy would be as limited as that of other
Indian princes.
It soon became apparent to the British that Sikh
participation--advancing toward Kabul through the Khyber Pass while
Shuja and the British advanced through Qandahar--would not be
forthcoming. Auckland's plan in the spring of 1838 was for the
Sikhs--with British support--to place Shuja on the Afghan throne. By
summer's end, however, the plan had changed; now the British alone would
impose the pliant Shuja.
GOVERNMENT AND
POLITICSSINCE
1973 AFGHAN SOCIETY has experienced a series of shocks which
has shattered its political institutions, devastated the
physical infrastructure supporting its economy, decimated and
scattered its population, and left open to question its
prospects for government and even survival as a national
community. There is no longer a monarchy presiding over a
confederacy of Pushtun tribes and ruling over several culturally distinct minority
communities. Political usurpation, foreign occupation, war and civil war
have left Afghanistan in chaos, with a leadership incapable, so far, of
initiating a process of recovery.
Intimately linked to Afghanistan's
tragedy was the Soviet Union's collapse at the end of 1991. Its demise
released the mostly Muslim peoples of Central Asia from the captivity of
Cold War politics. Their governments have been freed from proxy service
in superpower causes. European imperialist manipulation of the region
which had shaped its politics since the early nineteenth century had
suddenly come to an end.
Afghans now confront neighbors who are awakening to new
opportunities. Afghans struggle with the irony that the anarchy which
has followed their successful defiance of a superpower could lead to
their dissolution as a nation. Interference by neighbors became a major
factor in Afghan politics before the Soviet military withdrawal. It
became profoundly destabilizing with the collapse of the Kabul Marxist
regime in 1992.
Afghanistan's vulnerability to fragmentation has since become acute.
Its internal rivalries have become increasingly identified with regional
communities which it shares with neighboring nations. Every kilometer of
its borders is a product of British or tsarist Russian imperial policy.
The writ of those great powers having dissolved, such historical
artifacts could also disappear in a new era of regional tumult and
change. This chapter will focus on the forces and events which have led
to Afghanistan's break with its past leaving it exposed to a profoundly
uncertain future.
THE ATTEMPT TO MODERNIZE:
1953-73
Many
Afghans look back with nostalgia on the generation of
modernization, democratization and diverse foreign assistance
that began shortly after World War II. For the royal family
and its retainers, the challenge was to expand government
functions while retaining control after nearly a century of
hard won political consolidation. By the early 1950s, the
government presented an obvious paradox. Its authority was
stronger than ever, but acquiescence was problematic among
large sections of the population. Special immunities
maintained the loyalty of the eastern Pushtun tribes. The Shia Hazaras of the central Hazarajat still resented
the brutal suppression they had suffered at the end of the nineteenth
century. A Tajik rebel had seized control of Kabul as recently as 1929.
In 1947 a revolt of the Safi tribe of the Ghilzai confederation had to
be suppressed.
These challenges to royal authority firmly fixed the
attention of the government on internal security. Its primary objective
was enforcement of credible coercion over all challengers. Army officers
were frequently appointed governors of sensitive provinces. The Ministry
of Interior, with its mostly Pushtun senior staff, maintained an
authoritarian and arbitrary posture. Bureaucratic coercion was imposed
in the autocratic manner adopted from Persian tradition. Government
presence thus bordered on colonialism in the minority regions of the
north, west and center.
Such a heavy emphasis on control seriously limited resources
available for development. And, while it served to make official
authority appear formidable, the segmented and inward looking features
of Afghan society assured that the government's writ was actually
shallow on matters of most concern to rural and nomadic Afghans.
Traditional patriarchal, patrilinear organization of households,
lineages and clans determined local arrangements for property control,
division of labor, dispute settlement, and for physical security.
Government authority was kept at arms length.
Despite its own tribal heritage, the royal leadership was a foreign
entity to most of its fellow Pushtuns. Persianized in language and
partially detribalized in marriage and social relations, the royal and
administrative hierarchy was sensitive to its cultural isolation. Its
strenuous effort to impose Pushtu as the working language of government
on the Persian- (Dari-) speaking bureaucrats was an indication of the
monarchy's anxiety to be identified with Pushtun roots and sentiment.
Its dispute with Pakistan over Pushtunistan was another means of
identifying with Pushtuns
The Decision to
Accept Soviet Economic and Military Assistance
Within
this condition of fierce appearance and shallow control ,Prime
Minister Muhammad Daud and
King Zahir Shah attempted to transform the structure and purpose of
Afghan government. The most fateful innovation was Daud's decision to
accept Soviet military assistance. This move would immensely increase
the government's coercive powers, but at the risk of losing control of
some military officers to Marxist indoctrination.
As prime minister,
Daud maintained the royal style of ruling as an autocrat over a rigidly
centralized bureaucracy, but he saw that significant economic and
technological development required the broadening of educational,
professional, and entrepreneurial opportunities previously monopolized
by the royal family and court aristocracy. He also recognized the
political implications of a rapidly growing professional and
technocratic elite. He was the first royal leader to give major cabinet
posts to commoners, for example.
His cousin, King Zahir Shah, then gambled that reforms offering a
major political role to entrepreneurs, technocrats, professionals and
managers could be devolved gradually without destroying the monarchy.
This gamble turned out to be as portentous as Daud's acceptance of
Soviet aid. In both cases the purpose was compelling, but implementation
brought disaster. The consequences of both moves have demonstrated how
fragile was the political fabric that held Afghanistan together.
Great physical developments were achieved under Daud. Dominated by
the Soviet Union, the government began large scale constructions
projects in the mid-1950s, building hydroelectric power plants,
long-distance highways, and major civil installations. Shortly
thereafter the United States, Western European nations, Japan, and
United Nations (UN) agencies became heavily involved in the development
of mining, agriculture, education, civil administration, and health.