Another factor
which affected the mujahidin cause was the insistence that mujahidin
victory was to be synonymous with the transfer of power to the Peshawar
parties. The expatriate political process created a distorted perception
of the social and political realities created by fourteen years of war.
Contention for power at the national level could not be contained within
the parameters of a struggle essentially among Pushtuns based in
Peshawar. Challenges had emerged from the minorities, especially the
Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras. Moreover, the political arena was greatly
complicated by the intimate ties that neighboring governments and
political agencies had fashioned with the parties and the major
communities inside Afghanistan. For all the emphasis the Peshawar
leadership placed upon installing an Islamic order, implicit in their
expectations was the assumption that social basis of government was
continuity of Pushtun dominance.
Such expectations were as much a
product of the immediate concerns they faced in Pakistan as they were
linked to a tradition of Pushtun rule. The refugees, their captive
constituency, were overwhelmingly Pushtun and overwhelmingly from the
Ghilzai and eastern tribal areas. Almost all were villagers living in
massive, quasi-urban camps, subject to degrees of regimentation and
control which sharply contrasted with their accustomed autonomy. In
Pakistan they served as a political sounding board for the parties,
thereby magnifying the party leaders' perception of popular acceptance
of their ideology and themselves. It was convenient to overlook the fact
that large as it was, the refugee population did not genuinely represent
the demographic and social realities inside Afghanistan itself. As a
result of their absence, the refugees in Pakistan sharply reduced the
proportion of Pushtuns actually living inside Afghanistan. From a
putative majority, they had clearly become a distinct minority. While
refugee return after the war was expected, it was uncertain when they
could return and how many eventually would.
Pakistan's
Policies and Misperceptions
Such distortions in perception were shared by Pakistani
officials. Their policies were based on an assumption of Pushtun dominance in postwar
Afghanistan. The Pushtunistan issue had dominated relations between the
two countries since Pakistan had become a nation. Harboring
Afghanistan's potential future leadership offered insurance that once a
Pushtun dominated mujahidin government was installed it would drop the
issue. This goal was linked to Pakistan's heavy military investment in
the Ghilzai region adjacent to its border. Pakistan's involvement in
liberating the region was intended to improve future relations.
In
addition to ingrained cultural traits, resistance politics were shaped
by situational factors. The institutional and operational development of
the Peshawar parties was stunted by circumstances they could not
control. Pakistan's fear of Soviet reprisal induced it to oppose the
establishment of an Afghan government in exile. It also discouraged the
emergence of one party or a union of parties which could have made the
resistance less dependent. Pakistan's influence over the parties was
enhanced by compelling them to compete for support. In walking a
tightrope between partiality and caution, Pakistan's policies stunted
the growth of the parties.
The weakness of the parties was acutely evident in their failure to
create a credible shadow government in anticipation of Kabul's fall.
Anticipating the capture of a major city (Jalalabad or, perhaps, Khost)
in the wake of the Soviet pullback from the eastern border provinces in
the summer of 1988, the parties created a "provisional government" based
on a constitution that would establish an Islamic Republic. The
government was stillborn. No suitable seat to place it was captured, no
prominent leader was placed in charge of it, it was not funded, and the
parties, themselves, ignored it.
Once it became certain that the Soviets were leaving, the creation of
an authority capable of taking control of Afghanistan was more urgent.
This situation led to initiatives by Pakistan and the United States,
with Saudi support, to create an interim government which could
politically offset its rival in Kabul, coordinate the final military
effort and prepare for the establishment of a postwar government. A
shura (council) of resistance leaders met on February 10, 1989.
Token participation was permitted from expatriates abroad, but Shia
representatives were not seated due to a dispute over representation.
The prospect of transferring power to a separate authority paralyzed the
leadership. It feared political eclipse. An interim government might
connect with the commanders who already exercised control over much of
Afghanistan. Only Gailani made an effort to have major commanders
participate in the shura.
After considerable pressure from the ISI--and allegedly some bribing
with Saudi money--the Afghanistan Interim Government (AIG) was created.
In essence, it was a cabinet consisting of the seven party leaders and
their senior deputies and a few technocrats. The voting was arranged in
a manner which assured that the weakest parties would get the highest
posts. Mujaddidi was named Prime Minister and Sayyaf, his deputy. The
AIG was given the task of creating a permanent government acceptable to
popular will. Whether that process would be based on a jirgah
or elections was left open. An effort was made also to centralize
budgeting, but the parties continued to operate as they had before, with
little attention being paid the AIG by early 1990. Internecine Violence
Confronted in mid-1989
by evidence that the Kabul government was capable of defending
itself and showed no sign of immediate internal collapse, the
Peshawar parties turned on each other. The most serious
dispute brought the enmity between Hekmatyar and Rabbani to the surface. Throughout the war
their commanders had jockeyed for turf and supply routes, especially in
the strategic Shomali region with its control over the northern highway
between Kabul and the Soviet Union. Hekmatyar, with some Pakistani
connivance, had also waged a minor reign of terror among the refugee
community. It included intimidation, kidnaping, disappearances,
imprisonment and execution of critics and rivals among educated Afghans
and of rival mujahidin commanders and their followers. He was widely
feared and disliked.
Most of Hekmatyar's ire was focused on the Jamiat,
which had developed the most extensive network of commanders and was
especially identified with the minority communities. He did not avoid
clashes with rival Pushtuns, having attempted to dominate the tribal
fronts around Qandahar, without success.
In late July, 1989, Hekmatyar's forces in Takhar Province ambushed
and slaughtered more than thirty members of the army of Ahmad Shah
Massoud, Rabbani's most celebrated and successful commander. Seven
senior commanders were among those slain. Assaults and killings had
become common between commanders of these two parties, but this instance
was the most blatant. It also disrupted Massoud's plans for an assault
on Kabul. Massoud retaliated, over-running several Hezb positions in the
northeast. The perpetrators of the massacre were captured and later
executed by an Islamic court at Taloqan, Massoud's regional
headquarters.
Hekmatyar was condemned for his complicity in the massacre by leaders
other than Rabbani. For a while he withdrew from the AIG claiming that
his party would stake its fate on a popular elections inside
Afghanistan--a bemusing statement from a leader who prided himself on
his party's closed vanguard style.
Hekmatyar further alienated his colleagues by his involvement in an
attempt at a coup against Najibullah's government in March of 1990. It
was led by Defense Minister Shah Nawaz Tanai, a Khalqi. Hekmatyar's
forces were to attack Kabul simultaneously. The plot misfired because of
faulty communications. Najibullah quickly rounded up the Khalqi
conspirators. Tanai escaped by helicopter to Pakistan where he was
greeted and publicly accepted as an ally by Hekmatyar.
The Pakistan government's involvement in this abortive affair was
transparently obvious. Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's plea to the other
six party leaders to aid Tanai and Hekmatyar was rebuked as a disgrace
to the jihad. The episode was a crucial turning point in the struggle
against Kabul. It demonstrated that clandestine connections between
mujahidin and elements in the Kabul government could determine the
outcome of the civil war. It also further demonstrated the ISI's
partiality toward Hekmatyar: it had been involved in planning the
military follow-up to the coup attempt.
