The Struggle for Kabul
Continual fighting over Kabul
began, punctuated by assaults made by relatively small forces
employing firepower never dreamed possible by the mujahidin in their
guerilla phase. Short-range missiles with heavy explosives did most of
the damage. They wreaked devastation, killing far more civilians than
combatants. By early 1994 the city had been reduced to a shambles.
Neighborhoods, mosques, and government buildings had been destroyed. A
vagabond government shifted between surviving buildings. During the
heaviest fighting it operated from Charikar, sixty kilometers to the
north.
Despite the devastation Hekmatyar and the allies he gained in
1993 and 1994 were not able to defeat the government defenders. In
January 1993 he was joined by the Shia Hezb-i-Wahdat faction led by
Abdul Ali Mazari, who had Iranian backing and the support of many Shia
residents living in the western sector of Kabul. On several occasions
Mazari's forces and Rasul Sayyaf's Wahhabi followers engaged in vicious
battles in Kabul's western outskirts. Dostam also came to Mazari's
assistance. In turn Sayyaf sided with Rabbaani's forces led by Ahmad
Shah Massoud.
A year later Hekmatyar overcame his loudly expressed contempt for
Dostam as an ally of the communists and formed a tripartite alliance
with him and Mazari. They organized the Shura-i-ala Humaagi
inquilab-i-Islami Afghanistan (Supreme Coordination Council of the
Islamic Revolution in Afghanistan).
On January 1, 1994, they launched the most devastating assault so far
mounted against Kabul. It took several thousand lives and reduced
Kabul's population below 500,000 (it had reached more than 2 million
late in the Soviet war). During the first week government units lost
ground in both Southwestern and Southeastern Kabul, but soon regained
most of their positions. Massoud led an offensive in June which drove
Hekmatyar's rocket units off two strategic hills. Sporadic fighting
punctuated by rocket attacks on the city continued until early 1995.
As the fighting settled into a stalemate, several peace initiatives
were attempted. The UN renewed its peace making role in April 1994.
Leaders of the less powerful Mujahidin parties offered peace proposals.
Ismael Khan, the government's powerful ally in Herat, hosted a large
conference in July 1994 that agreed on a process for a transition to a
new government. It was blocked by opposition from the Supreme
Coordination Council and other commanders. Iran and the Organization of
the Islamic Conference (OIC) hosted a poorly attended peace conference
in Teheran in November. On December 28, 1994 the presidential term that
Rabbani, himself, recognized lapsed. With no resolution of conflict and
no consensus reached on a mechanism for transferring authority, he kept
the office by default, pending a new political settlement to be
engineered by the UN.
Sudden, unexpected developments in early 1995 profoundly changed the
situation. A new political/military force, the Taliban, sprang into
existence. This movement, identified with religious students was
centered among the Durrani Pushtuns who had been politically passive
during the previous fifteen years of war and tumult. The movement took
control of Kandahar in November, 1994. By February it was challenging
the Rabbani government from Kabul to Herat. The Taliban were students or
recent graduates of a network of traditional madrasas in
southern Afghanistan and adjacent areas of Pakistan. The origin of the
movement itself remains obscure, but once again a religious cause that
offered political purification and an end to Afghanistan's suffering won
widespread support.
The most significant and immediate result of the Taliban rise to
power, was the ignominious collapse of Hekmatyar's Hezb-i-Islami as a
fighting force. In early February his headquarters at Charasyab,
twenty-five kilometers south of Kabul, became trapped between the
government army and the Taliban. On February 15, Hekmatyar and his
disintegrating army fled eastward toward Jalalabad leaving a large
arsenal of weapons behind. Hezb was no longer a deadly threat to Kabul;
the struggle for power had been profoundly changed.
Mujahidin Attempts
to Govern, 1992-95Mujaddidi had little chance to organize a government during his two
months as interim president. Hekmatyar was an immediate threat:
Mujaddidi was nearly killed when his plane was hit by a Hezb rocket. The
cumbersome Leadership Council assured meddling by the parties, and the
government's very uncertain security depended on a motley mix of army
units taken over from Najib's government, Mausood's forces, and elements
of Dostam's militia. Attempting to find maneuvering room, Mujaddidi
favored Dostam as a regional power whom he might balance against Massoud,
who had taken charge of the defense ministry. The President raised
Dostam's rank from militia chief to senior army general.
Mujaddidi
attempted to extend his short term, but lacked the political leverage to
offset the military weakness of his party. His resentment toward Rabbani,
his successor, would later add to the rivalries between mujahidin
politics.
Rabbani and Massoud attempted to create a national army by
recruitment of mujahidin rank and file primarily to gain government
control over Kabul itself. It had been divided into separate armed camps
of mujahidin who settled among their own ethnic groups clustered in
separate neighborhoods. These efforts were interrupted by Hekmatyar's
first major rocket attack on the city in August, 1992. His forces were
pushed back jointly by Massoud and Dostam. Under Pakistani pressure
Rabbani agreed to a cease-fire which brought general peace to the city
for more than three months. Massoud attempted to recruit leaders from
other parties, including the Shias, for senior military positions.
Mazari's Hezb-i-Wahdat party was assigned two cabinet positions.
With Hekmatyar apparently deflated, Rabbani's government concentrated
on preparing for a national shura which was to draft a constitution and
choose an interim government for the next eighteen months. The accord
reached in Peshawar in April called for elections at the end of the
second interim period. The Leadership council gave Rabbani an extension
until December to complete the drafting. His proposal for the next
interim period was ambitious. He called for a Shura-yi-Ahl-i Hal-u-'Aqd
(Council of Resolution and Settlement). A comprehensive effort was made
to convene a large assembly representing sentiment in every district in
the country. Some 1,400 representatives were brought to Kabul in
mid-December where they overwhelmingly (916 to 59 with 366 abstentions)
voted to elect Rabbani to a full two-year term, not the eighteen months
mandated by the Peshawar accords.
The backlash from this decision reshuffled alignments and took the
Islamic Republic's politics in an uncharted direction. Among the major
parties only Jamiat (from which Rabbani formally resigned to assume the
new presidency), Muhammad Nabi's Harakat, and Sayyaf's Ittehad accepted
the election. Gailani and Mujaddidi (vexed already by the extension of
Rabbani's term) joined Khalis, Hekmatyar, Mazari, and Dostam to oppose
it on grounds that the election had been rigged and was not
representative of the country. Rabbani had attempted to garner a popular
mandate and instead had united his rivals, greatly strengthening
Hekmatyar's position.
Rabbani was immediately thrown on the defensive, politically and
militarily. Alienated by government attempts to get control of the city,
the Shia Wahdat had attacked the government in western Kabul before the
council met and was temporarily supported by Dostam's units on the other
side of the city. These assaults were quickly repulsed, but immediately
after Rabbani's election Hekmatyar attacked with Wahdat support. The
city was again massively rocketed until mid-February. Only three foreign
embassies remained open in the capital: Italy's, India's, and China's.
For the government there was one compensation: Sayyaf, the most
consistent ideologue of the party leaders, maintained his alliance with
the government in order to pursue his sectarian struggle with the Shias.
The Islamabad and Jalalabad Accords, March-April 1993
Worried over the prospect that the continuing turmoil might embroil
themselves in the Afghan conflict, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Iran
put pressure on the mujahidin leaders to find a political solution. In
Islamabad on March 7, 1993 they reached yet another agreement. Rabbani
was to continue as president until June, 1994; Hekmatyar was to resume
the prime ministership, the Leadership council was to be terminated--as
Rabbani had attempted to do in December--and all parties were again to
be represented in the cabinet. All three neighbors endorsed the
agreement as did the Organization of the Islamic Conference. To
reinforce their new commitment the Afghan leaders visited Mecca and the
three neighboring capitals.
Two days afterwards the Wahdat recommenced
rocketing government areas. Disputes over selection of the cabinet and
an attack on Rabbani when he attempted to meet Hekmatyar in a Kabul
suburb negated the agreement.
Hekmatyar now demanded the removal of Massoud from the government and
the setting up of commissions representing all parties in the ministries
of Defense, Interior and Foreign Affairs. Rabbani insisted on having the
right to veto Hekmatyar's choices for the cabinet. Hekmatyar launched a
major attack on April 24, which continued until mid-May. The mujahidin
council governing Jalalabad then hosted a three-week conference in which
leaders of all parties were confined within the conference building with
much public pressure to reach an agreement.
On May 18, 1993, the previous agreement was essentially re-instated.
Additional refinements authorized Hekmatyar to chair a commission
governing the Interior ministry, with two commissioners appointed from
every province. Rabbani was to chair Defense with a similarly unwieldy
commission. This charade was to ensure that Massoud's authority would be
swamped and he formally resigned, apparently leaving government for a
short period. A new high council of party members and notables also was
reinstated, presumably to oversee Rabbani.
Rabbani had been politically outflanked. For the first time his
forces suffered significant setbacks in the Darulaman and adjacent
southeastern sections of Kabul. Wahdat induced defections from the
pro-government Shias led by Sheikh Asif Muhseni and there were further
defections from former DRA units. Rabbani appeared cornered. At this
point, the momentum appeared to shift again. In April, Massoud's forces
had consolidated control of the highly strategic Shomali region north of
Kabul. Rabbani's powerful regional commander, Ismail Khan, extended his
authority from Herat to include much of Helmand Province in the south by
reaching alliances with Durrani affiliated commanders. This strategy
enabled him to drive out forces allied with Hekmatyar.
Meanwhile Hekmatyar demonstrated his well-known caution by refusing
to enter Kabul. He preferred the command center he had created at
Charasyab. Arrangements , but many were missing and refused to go to
Charasyab to conduct government business.
Throughout the rest of 1993 fighting near Kabul was reduced to
occasional rocketing, except for heavy fighting between Sayyaf and
Mazari's Wahdat over the proposals for applying the Sharia in the
proposed constitution. Sayyaf was chair of the drafting commission.
Meanwhile there was much political maneuvering. Dostam visited Kabul in
July, allegedly impressed by the defense the government had mounted.
There were rumors his impressive military establishment at
Mazar-i-Sharif was running out of funds and he had fallen out with his
major ally, Sayyid Mansor of the Kayan (Ismaili) militia, who controlled
much of strategic Baghlan Province. Dostam saw Massoud and he also met
Hekmatyar. In August Massoud, himself, extended a wary hand to Hekmatyar.
These intrigues ended abruptly with 1993. In the new year, Hekmatyar
and Dostam mounted their joint assault on Kabul and also on Massoud's
position in the northeast. The government's defenses held through five
months of fighting and then counterattacked in June. Rabbani hung on to
his shrinking legitimacy as president, and a quest for a political
solution began in earnest.