The Council of
Commanders, 1990-92
I
n
1990 the political disarray at Peshawar spawned an attempt by
commanders inside Afghanistan to develop a coordinated command
structure among themselves. Led by Abdul Haq, an outspoken commander affiliated with Yunis Khalis, a
series of increasingly larger meetings was held, climaxing with one in
Massoud's Panjshir valley in September. It was widely representative of
the major commanders and drew up a set of understandings on mutual
support and cooperation. But it was not able to create a comprehensive
command structure that could solve logistical difficulties or coordinate
a nationwide strategy. The commanders did not build a workable political
system.
Dependence on the parties and Pakistan for supplies was too
pervasive. Their jealousy regarding their own hard-won autonomy was also
a factor. They shared the same territorial mentality that had kept the
party leaders from uniting.
Neighboring Governments:
Involvements and Interference
Divisions within the resistance were
exacerbated by foreign interference. As American support declined
after the Soviet withdrawal, the mujahidin found themselves increasingly dependent on assistance from
their neighbors, especially Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Iran. With this
dependence came interference which distracted from the effort to defeat
the Kabul regime.
Pakistan
Pakistan's interference principally took the form of favoritism
between the Peshawar parties. It was especially evident in its
clandestine attempt to back the Hekmatyar-Tanai coup. It was more
obvious in the ISI's support of mujahidin attacks on towns in the
eastern region after the failure at Jalalabad. "packaging," or the
combination of training, supply, and mutual tactical planning, had
become the ISI's approach to assisting the mujahidin. It was especially
evident in the siege and final capture of Khost in early 1991. Again,
Hekmatyar's forces were favored in the packaging arrangements. This
situation contrasted sharply with the fall off in supplies to Rabbani's
major commanders, Massoud in the northeast and Ismail Khan near Herat.
Attempts by the ISI to introduce the packaging approach to the loose
coalition of commanders around Qandahar were rebuked due to the ISI's
insistence on control.
Saudi Arabia
Arab interference was in some ways more aggravating . Saudi aid to
the mujahidin, which roughly matched that of the United States, had been
crucial in accelerating the guerilla war against the Soviet forces.
Also, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states (except Iraq) had severely
criticized Soviet behavior in Afghanistan. Their involvement continued
after the Soviet departure. Alongside of this generous, long-term
government assistance, unofficial parallel involvement became
increasingly disruptive and disliked. During the Soviet-Afghan war a
costly effort was made by private, often religious, Arab agencies to
provide educational opportunities for Afghan refugees encamped in
Pakistan. Obvious attempts were also made to introduce doctrinal
interpretations of Islam espousing teachings of the Wahhabi sect
dominant in Saudi Arabia. Such indoctrination was accompanied by a
growing stream of free-lance individuals and groups of Arabs seeking to
participate in the jihad. As the mujahidin expanded their areas of
control after the Soviet forces withdrew, Arabs took part in the capture
of villages and towns, especially in Kunar and Nangrahar provinces.
Incidents including massacres of men, abductions of women and various
atrocities were attributed to them in 1988 and 1989.
Many Afghans
resented Wahhabi proselytizing. It was carried out with particular
aggressiveness in Kunar. For two years a community of Arabs and Afghan
converts dominated the province under the leadership of Jamil-ur-Rahman,
a Pushtun native. Other Wahhabi cells were established, including a
community at Paghman, which served as the base for Rasul Sayyaf, the
mujahidin party leader most closely identified with Saudi Arabia.
Arab policy and behavior appeared intimately mixed. The spreading of
a doctrine, recognized as the official Saudi version of Islam, made it
difficult to separate religion from politics. From the official
perspective Saudi diplomacy toward Afghanistan was aimed at limiting
Iranian influence. This objective was given higher priority when it
became possible to extend it to the recently sovereign nations of
Central Asia. Afghanistan forms the collegial and logistical link
through which Arab influence can compete with Iran's in Tajikistan,
Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. Such Arab ambitions coupled with apparent
attempts to create an Afghan Wahhabi state within a state have deepened
Saudi penetration of Afghan politics.
Iran
Afghan resentment toward Iran has also grown. The canker is older
and deeper than with Pakistanis and Arabs. Sharing the same plateau,
language and a long overlapping history in which Persians/Iranians
have had the greater portion of cultural grandeur, the modern
relationship has been awkward. Part of this derives directly from
Iranian perception of the Shias of Afghanistan, especially the
Hazaras, as oppressed sectarian brethren. This has been a sensitive
matter for the Pushtun leadership which inherited Abdur Rahman's
conquest of the Hazaras. Pushtuns also resent having to accept the
Persian language and traditions in order to achieve elite cultural
status. For their part Iranians are frustrated by their loss of
Herat in the mid-nineteenth century.
In diplomacy and especially in
its involvements in the Hazarajat, Iran has made clear its
conviction that it has a significant stake in the outcome of
Afghanistan's tragedy. During the Soviet war Iran made a concerted
effort to train and support Hazara groups for the purpose of
introducing extensions of its own revolution into Afghanistan.
Several parties were organized and infiltrated into the Hazarajat.
The most effective were Pasdaran and Nasr. They confronted the Shura
led by Sayyid Beheshti, a coalition of traditional Hazara notables
which had taken control of the region in 1979. During the middle
1980s, the Iran-supported groups seriously weakened the Shura, but
their imposition of revolutionary doctrine backfired, forcing them
to make concessions and to accept joint rule with the Shura.
At the time of the Soviet
withdrawal, Iran made a strenuous effort to convince the mujahidin
leadership to concede as much as 25 percent of the representation in the
proposed Afghan Interim Government to the Shias. This proposal was
vehemently rejected.
Relations became further
complicated by Iran's overtures to the Najibullah government and Moscow
after the Soviet withdrawal. Teheran intimated endorsement of Soviet and
Najibullah's proposals for a possible political settlement of the war.
In return, the Kabul government gave assurances it would not interfere
with the defacto autonomy of the Hazarajat, a region over which it had
lost virtually all control.
Such outside involvement
complicated and distorted the mujahidin effort to defeat the Kabul
forces. Especially disabling was their dependence on neighbors for much
of the financial and material support for continuing the war. As had
happened in the past, all the Afghan protagonists in the struggle to
control their country were beholden to outside forces whose agendas had
major implications for the political outcome. With the withdrawal of
Soviet and United States support at the end of 1991, the impact of
regional meddling increased.
MUJAHIDIN VICTORY: THE
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN
The Demise of the Soviet Union, 1991
With the failure of the communist hardliners to take over the Soviet
government in August 1991, Najibullah's supporters in the Soviet Army
lost their power to dictate Afghan policy. The effect was immediate. On
September 13, the Soviet government, now dominated by Boris Yeltsin,
agreed with the United States on a mutual cutoff of military aid to both
sides in the Afghan civil war. It was to begin January 1, 1992.
The post-coup Soviet government then attempted to develop political
relations with the Afghan resistance. In mid-November it invited a
delegation of the resistance's AIG to Moscow where the Soviets agreed
that a transitional government should prepare Afghanistan for national
elections. The Soviets did not insist that Najibullah or his colleagues
participate in the transitional process. Having been cut adrift both
materially and politically, Najibullah's faction torn government began
to fall apart.
During the nearly three years that the Kabul government had
successfully defended itself against mujahidin attacks, factions within
the government had also developed quasi-conspiratorial connections with
its opponents. Even during the Soviet war Kabul's officials had arranged
case-fires, neutral zones, highway passage and even passes allowing
unarmed mujahidin to enter towns and cities. As the civil war developed
into a stalemate in 1989, such arrangements proliferated into political
understandings. Combat generally ceased around Qandahar because most of
the mujahidin commanders had an understanding with its provincial
governor. Ahmad Shah Massoud developed an agreement with Kabul to keep
the vital north-south highway open after the Soviet withdrawal. The
greatest mujahidin victory during the civil war, the capture of Khost,
was achieved through the collaboration of its garrison. Hekmatyar's
cooperation with Tanai, the Khalqi Defense Minister is discussed above.
Interaction with opponents became a major facet of Najibullah's
defensive strategy, Many mujahidin groups were literally bought off with
arms, supplies and money to become militias defending towns, roads and
installations. Such arrangements carried the danger of backfiring. When
Najibullah's political support ended and the money dried up, such
allegiances crumbled.
The Fall of Kabul, April
1992
Kabul ultimately fell to the mujahidin because the factions in its government
had finally pulled it apart. Until demoralized by the defections of its
senior officers, the army had achieved a level of performance it had
never reached under direct Soviet tutelage. It was a classic case of
loss of morale. The regime collapsed while it still possessed material
superiority. Its stockpiles of munitions and planes would provide the
victorious mujahidin with the means of waging years of highly
destructive war. Kabul was short of fuel and food at the end of winter
in 1992, but its military units were supplied well enough to fight
indefinitely. They did not fight because their leaders were reduced to
scrambling for survival. Their aid had not only been cut off, the
Marxist-Leninist ideology that had provided the government its rationale
for existence been repudiated at its source.
A few days after it was
clear that Najibullah had lost control, his army commanders and
governors arranged to turn over authority to resistance commanders and
local notables throughout the country. Joint councils or shuras
were immediately established for local government in which civil and
military officials of the former government were usually included.
Reports indicate the process was generally amicable. In many cases prior
arrangements for transferring regional and local authority had been made
between foes.
Through mid-1995 these local arrangements have generally remained in
place in most of Afghanistan. Disruptions have occurred where local
political arrangements have been linked to been linked to the struggle
that has developed between the mujahidin parties. At the national level
a political vacuum was created and into it fell the expatriate parties
in their rush to take control. The enmities, ambitions, conceits and
dogmas which had paralyzed their shadow government proved to be even
more disastrous in their struggle for power. The traits they brought
with them had been accentuated in the struggle for preferment in
Peshawar.
Collusions between military leaders quickly brought down the Kabul
government. In mid-January 1992, within three weeks of demise of the
Soviet Union, Ahmad Shah Massoud was aware of conflict within the
government's northern command. General Abdul Momim, in charge of the
Hairatan border crossing at the northern end of Kabul's supply highway,
and other non-Pushtun generals based in Mazari-i-Sharif feared removal
by Najibullah and replacement by Pushtun officers. The generals rebelled
and the situation was taken over by Abdul Rashid Dostam, who held
general rank as head of the Jozjani militia, also based in
Mazar-i-Sharif. He and Massoud reached a political agreement, together
with another major militia leader, Sayyid Mansor, of the Ismaili
community based in Baghlan Province. These northern allies consolidated
their position in Mazar-i-Sharif on March 21. Their coalition covered
nine provinces in the north and northeast. As turmoil developed within
the government in Kabul, there was no government force standing between
the northern allies and the major air force base at Begram, some seventy
kilometers north of Kabul. By mid-April the air force command at Begram
had capitulated to Massoud. Kabul was defenseless, its army was no
longer reliable.
Najibullah had lost internal control immediately after he announced
his willingness on March 18 to resign in order to make way for a neutral
interim government. As the government broke into several factions the
issue had become how to carry out a transfer of power. Najibullah
attempted to fly out of Kabul on April 17, but was stopped by Dostam's
troops who controlled Kabul Airport under the command of Karmal's
brother, Mahmud Baryalai. Vengeance between Parchami factions was
reaped. Najibullah took sanctuary at the UN mission where he remained in
1995. A group of Parchami generals and officials declared themselves an
interim government for the purpose of handing over power to the
mujahidin.
For more than a week Massoud remained poised to move his forces into
the capital. He was awaiting the arrival of political leadership from
Peshawar. The parties suddenly had sovereign power in their grasp, but
no plan for executing it. With his principal commander prepared to
occupy Kabul, Rabbani was positioned to prevail by default. Meanwhile UN
mediators tried to find a political solution that would assure a
transfer of power acceptable to all sides.