The Pashtunistan Issue Amir Abdur Rahman had bitterly resented the Durand Line and none of his successors relinquished the notion of Pashtun unity even as they cooperated with the British government on other matters. Eventually, the line dividing the Pashtun people became extremely contentious to the governments of both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Although the issue became most vexing during partition, British policy in the area before 1947 also aggravated the Pashtunistan problem. In 1901 the British had created a new administrative area, the North-West Frontier Province, which they detached from the Punjab. This new province was divided into Settled Districts and Tribal Agencies, with the latter ruled by a British political agent who reported directly to Delhi. In 1934 Britain extended self-government to the North-West Frontier Province. By this time, the Indian National Congress (Congress Party), which many Muslims saw as a predominately Hindu organization, had expanded its political activities to include the province. The links between the political leaders of the North-West Frontier Province and the Hindu leaders of Congress were such that a majority in the North-West Frontier Province assembly originally voted to go with India in the partition, a decision which probably would have been rejected by the voting majority in the province. In July 1947, the British held a referendum in the Settled Districts of the province offering the population the choice of either joining an independent India or a now-inevitable Pakistan. An estimated 56 percent of the eligible voters participated and over 90 percent elected to join Pakistan. A loya jirgah was held in the Tribal Agencies. Offered a choice between joining India or Pakistan, the tribes declared their preference for the latter. Although both Afghanistan and Pakistan made conciliatory gestures, the matter remained unresolved. In one of the government's attempts to suppress tribal uprisings in 1949, a Pakistani air force plane bombed a village just across the frontier. In response, the Afghan government called a loya jirgah, which promptly declared that it recognized "neither the imaginary Durand nor any similar line" and that all agreements--from the 1893 Durand agreement onward--pertaining to the issue were void. Irregular forces led by a local Pashtun leader crossed the border in 1950 and 1951 to back Afghan claims. Pakistan's government refused to accept the Afghan assertion that it had no control over these men, and both nations' ambassadors were withdrawn, but were exchanged again a few months later. The issue of an international boundary through Pashtun areas was of
great importance to policymakers in Kabul. Pakistan halted vital
transshipments of petroleum to Afghanistan for about three months in
1950, presumably in retaliation for Afghan tribal attacks across the
border. At this time, Afghan government interest shifted to offers of
aid from the Soviet Union and in July 1950 it signed a major agreement
with the Soviet Union.
Early Links with the
Soviet Union
Pakistan's petroleum
cutoff over the Pashtunistan issue and the resulting trade agreement between
Afghanistan and the Soviet Union were major watersheds in bilateral
relations. The agreement was much more than a barter arrangement
exchanging Soviet oil, textiles, and manufactured goods for Afghan wool
and cotton; the Soviets offered construction aid to erect petroleum
storage facilities, to explore oil and gas reserves in northern
Afghanistan, and permission for free transportation of goods across
Soviet territory. This new relationship was attractive not only because
it made it difficult for Pakistan to disrupt the Afghan economy by
blockading or slowing down transshipped goods but also because it
provided a balance to United States aid in the Helmand Valley Project.
After 1950 Soviet-Afghan trade increased sharply as Soviet technicians
were welcomed and a trade office was opened.
Experiment with
Liberalized Politics The
third major policy focus of the immediate post-World War II period was
Shah Mahmud's experiment in
greater political tolerance and liberalization. Encouraged by young,
Western-educated members of the political elite, the prime minister
allowed National Assembly elections that were distinctly less controlled
than they had been in the past; the result was the "liberal parliament"
of 1949. He tolerated the activity of opposition political groups. The
most vocal of these groups was the Wikh-i-Zalmayan (Awakened Youth), a
movement comprised of diverse dissident groups founded in Qandahar in
1947. A newly formed student union not only provided a forum for
political debate but also produced theatrical plays critical of Islam
and the monarchy. Newspapers criticized the government, and many groups
began demanding a more open political system.
But the liberalization
went farther than the prime minister had intended. He reacted by
attempting to form a government party, and when this failed, he began
cracking down. The Kabul University student union was dissolved in 1951;
newspapers criticizing the government were closed down; many opposition
leaders were jailed. The parliament that was elected in 1952 was a
significant step backward from the one that had been elected in 1949.
The brief experiment in open politics was over. Despite its failure, the liberal experiment had important
repercussions for the nation's political future: it provided a breeding
ground for the revolutionary movement that would come to power in 1978.
Future Marxist leaders of Afghanistan, Nur Muhammad Taraki, Babrak
Karmal, and Hafizullah Amin were all involved. The government crackdown
in 1951 and 1952 that brought an abrupt end to liberalization alienated
many young, reformist Afghans who had originally hoped only to improve
the existing structure rather than radically transforming it.
Daoud as Prime Minister,
1953-63
Despite Daoud's concern with correcting what
he perceived as previous governments' pro-Western bias, his keen
interest in modernization manifested itself in continued support of the
Helmand Valley Project. Daoud also proceeded cautiously on the question
of the emancipation of women. At the fortieth celebration of national
independence in 1959, the wives of his ministers appeared unveiled in
public at his behest. When religious leaders protested, he challenged
them to cite a single verse of the Quran specifically mandating veiling.
When they continued to resist, he jailed them for a week. Daoud's social and economic policies were cautiously reformist and
relatively successful. Although fruitful in some respects, his foreign
policy caused severe economic dislocation, and, ultimately, his own
political eclipse. Daoud's foreign policy was guided by two principles:
balancing what he saw as pro-Western orientation on the part of previous
governments by improving relations with the Soviet Union (without
sacrificing U.S. economic aid), and pursuing the Pashtunistan issue by
every possible means. To some extent the two goals were mutually
reinforcing when hostile relations with Pakistan caused the Kabul
government to fall back on the Soviet Union and its trade and transit
link with the rest of the world. Daoud believed that the rivalry between
the two superpowers for local allies created a condition whereby he
could play one against the other in his search for aid and development
assistance. Daoud's desire for improved bilateral relations with the Soviet Union
stepped up a notch to a necessity when the Pakistan-Afghan border was
closed for five months in 1955. When the Iranian and United States
governments declared that they were unable to create an alternate trade
access route through Afghanistan, the Afghans had no choice but to
request a renewal of their 1950 transit agreement with the Soviet Union.
Ratified in June 1955, it was followed by a new bilateral barter
agreement. After the Soviet leaders Nikolay Bulganin and Nikita
Khrushchev visited Kabul in 1955, they announced a US$100 million
development loan for projects to be mutually agreed upon. Despite the Cold War climate between the two superpowers, the Daoud
regime also sought to strengthen its ties with the United States, whose
interest in Afghanistan had grown as a result of United States efforts
to forge an alliance among the countries in the "Northern Tier":
Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and Turkey. Maintaining its
nonaligned position, Afghanistan refused to join the United
States-sponsored Baghdad Pact. This rebuff did not stop the United
States from continuing its low-level aid program, but it was reluctant
to provide Afghanistan with military assistance, so Daoud turned to the
Soviet Union and its allies for military aid, and in 1955 he received
approximately US$25 million of military matériel. In addition, the
Soviet bloc also began construction of military airfields in Bagram,
Mazar-e-Sharif, and Shindand. In the face of Daoud's virtual obsession with the Pashtunistan issue,
all other foreign policy issues faded in importance. In 1953 and 1954,
Daoud applied more of his time-honored techniques to press the
Pashunistan issue, such as payments to tribesmen on both sides of the
border to subvert the Pakistani government as well as dissemination of
hostile propaganda. In 1955, however, the situation became more critical
from Daoud's point of view when internal politics forced Pakistan to
abolish the four provincial governments of West Pakistan and form one
provincial unit (the One Unit Plan). The Afghan government protested the
abolition of the North-West Frontier Province (excluding the Tribal
Agencies). The Pakistan border closure in the spring and fall of 1955
again highlighted the need for good relations with the Soviets in order
to keep transit routes open for Afghan trade. Although the Afghans remained unresigned to accepting the status quo
on the Pashtunistan issue, the conflict remained dormant for several
years (in which time relations improved slightly between the two
nations). The 1958 coup that brought General Mohammad Ayub Khan to power
in Pakistan also failed to bring on any immediate change in the
situation. In 1960 Daoud sent troops across the border into Bajaur in a
foolhardy, unsuccessful attempt to manipulate events in that area and to
press the Pashtunistan issue, but Afghan military forces were routed by
the Pakistan military. During this period the propaganda war, carried on
by radio, was relentless. Afghanistan and Pakistan severed relations on September 6, 1961.
Traffic between the two countries came to a halt, just as two of
Afghanistan's major export crops, grapes and pomegranates, were ready to
be shipped to India. In a valuable public relations gesture, the Soviet
Union offered to buy the crops and airlift them from Afghanistan. What
the Soviets did not ship, Ariana Afghan Airlines flew to India in 1961
and 1962. At the same time, the United States attempted to mediate the
dispute, although its ties with Pakistan were a stumbling block. In addition, much of the equipment and material provided by foreign
aid programs and needed for development projects was held up in
Pakistan. Another outgrowth of the dispute was Pakistan's decision to
close the border to nomads (members of the Ghilzai, variously known as
Powindahs or Suleiman Khel), who had long been spending winters in
Pakistan and India and summers in Afghanistan. The Pakistani government
statement denying the decision was related to the impasse with
Afghanistan appeared disingenuous, and the issue added to the brewing
conflict between the two countries. Afghanistan's economic situation
continued to deteriorate. The government was heavily dependent upon
customs revenues, which fell dramatically; trade suffered; and foreign
exchange reserves were seriously depleted. By 1963 it became clear that neither Daoud of Afghanistan nor Ayub
Khan of Pakistan would yield; to settle the issue one of them would have
to be removed from power. Despite growing criticism of Ayub among some
of his countrymen, his position was generally strong, whereas
Afghanistan's economy was suffering. In March 1963, with the backing of
the royal family, King Zahir Shah sought Daoud's resignation on the
basis that the country's economy was deteriorating as a result of his
Pashtunistan policy. Because he controlled the armed forces, Daoud
almost certainly had the power to resist the king's request, yet he
resigned, and Muhammad Yousuf, a non-Pashtun, German-educated technocrat
who had been minister of mines and industries became prime minister. |
